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Abstract
The paper is devoted to the relationship between psychophysics and physics of mind.
The basic trends in psychophysics development are briefly discussed with special atten-
tion focused on Teghtsoonian’s hypotheses. These hypotheses pose the concept of the
universality of inner psychophysics and enable to speak about psychological space as an
individual object with its own properties. Turning to the two-component description
of human behavior (I. Lubashevsky, Physics of the Human Mind, Springer, 2017) the
notion of mental space is formulated and human perception of external stimuli is treated
as the emergence of the corresponding images in the mental space. On one hand, these
images are caused by external stimuli and their magnitude bears the information about
the intensity of the corresponding stimuli. On the other hand, the individual structure of
such images as well as their subsistence after emergence is determined only by the prop-
erties of mental space on its own. Finally, the mental operations of image comparison
and their scaling are defined in a way allowing for the bounded capacity of human cog-
nition. As demonstrated, the developed theory of stimulus perception is able to explain
the basic regularities of psychophysics, e.g., (i) the regression and range effects leading to
the overestimation of weak stimuli and the underestimation of strong stimuli, (ii) scalar
variability (Weber’s and Ekman’ laws), and (iii) the sequential (memory) effects. As
the final result, a solution to the Fechner-Stevens dilemma is proposed. This solution
posits that Fechner’s logarithmic law is not a consequences of Weber’s law but stems
from the interplay of uncertainty in evaluating stimulus intensities and the multi-step
scaling required to overcome the stimulus incommensurability.
Keywords: Inner psychophysics, physics of mind, universality, mental space, sensation
1. Introduction: From psychophysics to physics of mind
The inner world of humans as an object admitting analytical investigation has at-
tracted attention for many centuries starting from ancient Greek philosophy. An im-
portant step in this direction was made in the second half of 19th century when in
the frameworks of psychology and physiology a new branch of science—psychophysics—
appeared. The subject-matter of this science may be characterized as the quantitative
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description of the relationship between physical stimuli and the sensations and percep-
tions they produce.
Actually right at the birth of psychophysics it was recognized that there are outer and
inner psychophysics partly overlapping. The former focuses the attention on the direct
transformation of physical stimuli into human sensation of these stimuli and studies the
stimulus-sensation relationship as a whole leaving aside possible mechanisms governing
this transformation. Within the given approach a large amount of experimental data
were accumulated in the 20th century.
The latter brings into focus plausible mechanisms by which this transformation could
be implemented, in particular, raises a question about their nature. Namely, whether the
found laws of stimulus-sensation transformation are based on the particular physiology
of sense organs or have to be attributed to the top level of mental processes. By the
end of 20th century neuroscience of brain activity has provided evidence for the second
standpoint, at least, it concerns the conscious component of human sensation related to
evaluating perceived stimuli.
Attributing the mechanisms of psychophysical laws to the top level mental phenomena
it becomes possible to analyze them from an alternative point of view. Following the
gist of phenomenology developed in philosophy of mind in the 20th century these laws
might be elucidated ascribing some properties directly to the human mind as whole. In
this case accepting the transformation of physical stimuli into the corresponding neural
signals by the sense organs to be of a rather simple form, the psychophysical laws are
explained turning to the complex behavior of the mind as an object with own properties
and dynamics.
The efficiency of such an approach turning to the top-down causation has been demon-
strated by the recent development of synergetics—new science of self-organization—
dealing with various non-linear phenomena in the inanimate world as well as in modeling
brain activity, human behavior, and social phenomena. It is reflected in the appear-
ance of novel disciplines such as mathematical psychology including its applications to
psychophysical problems, socio-physics, and econo-physics.
In order to describe the behavior of humans affected by external stimuli and respond-
ing to them I put forward a general approach that can be referred to as physics of the
human mind [1]. Its pivot point is the introduction of two complementary components—
objective and subjective ones. The objective component is related to the physical world
and governed by the classical laws of physics. Returning to psychophysical issues the
sense organs and their functioning in transformation of physical stimuli into neural sig-
nals should be regarded the objective component. In this case the subjective component
represents the mind-body interaction from the standpoint of mind. The mind is treated
as an object with its own properties. These properties reflect neurophysiological pro-
cesses in the brain but not are enslaved by them. In this way we gain the ability to allow
for the basic human properties in the corresponding mathematical models appealing to
our consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.
The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that within physics of mind it
is possible to construct a rather simple model of how perceived stimuli are reflected in
the mind and how the mind operates with them. Base on a few premises this model
reproduces many psychological laws seeming to be mutually independent and proposes
a solution to some challenging problems in psychophysics.
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2. Basic psychophysical laws & Fechner-Stevens dilemma
Psychophysics is rooted in experimental psychology of the late 19th century, its birth
is related to the publication of the famous book Elements of Psychophysics (1860) by
Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887). In this book Fechner posed a number of questions
about the interrelation between the intensity of various physical stimuli and human sen-
sation of these stimuli (for introduction see, e.g., [2, 3]). Actually at birth psychophysics
underwent bifurcation, Fechner himself drew a crucial distinction between outer and
inner psychophysics, which differ in subject-matter; a detailed review of this issue can
be found in Refs. [4, 5]. According to Fechner, human sensation is implemented as a
sequence of two transformations with own properties:
• stimulus → psychophysical processes,1
• psychophysical processes → sensation.
Outer psychophysics deals with the two transformations as a whole and studies the
stimulus-sensation relationship based on direct observation and experimentation.
Inner psychophysics focuses on the latter transformation and has to draw inferences
from the findings of outer psychophysics. Experimentation and quantification are rather
problematic in inner psychophysics; for this reason inner psychophysics was rejected for a
long time starting from Fechner’s contemporaries. Nevertheless, Fechner himself consid-
ered that regularities found in outer psychophysics and being only approximate become
strictly valid in inner psychophysics, which makes inner psychophysics important branch
of science on its own. For the modern state of the art in inner psychophysics taking into
account the advances in cognitive neuroscience analyzing the mapping between mental
quantities and the brain states a reader may be referred to [6].
Based on the findings of his mentor Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795–1878), Fechner
formulated one of the basic psychophysical laws, Weber’s law, which is widely accepted
to hold for all our sensory modalities. Weber’s law relates the perception threshold ∆S
of variations (the just-noticeable difference) in the intensity S of some physical stimulus,
e.g., sound or light, to its intensity S via the proportionality with a coefficient κw often
referred to as the Weber fraction,
∆S = κwS or its later modification ∆S = κwS + η (1)
allowing for this stimulus of low intensity via adding some constant η interpreted as the
result of sensory noise. For example, the characteristic values of Weber fractions for
visual length of lines, brightness, and loudness are estimated as κw = 0.04, 0.08, and 0.1,
respectively [7].
Appealing to Weber’s law, Fechner put forward the principle that an arithmetic series
of mental magnitudes of perceived physical stimuli should correspond to a geometric series
of their intensities (energies) [e.g., 2]. In the framework of this principle the ratio ∆S/S
is regarded as the induced increment in the sensory magnitude ∆M of the given physical
stimulus, whence it follows that
M = κw lnS for S  η/κw. (2)
1In modern terms psychophysical process may be treated as the generation of neural signal by the
corresponding sense organ.
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This logarithmic relationship is often referred to as Fechner’s law. It should be empha-
sized that the introduction of the additive term in Weber’s law (1) eliminates the formal
logarithmic singularity of Fechner’s law at S → 0. An alternative approach to tackling
this singularity was proposed by Guilford [8] assuming Weber’s law to be of the form
∆S ∝ Sd with the exponent d < 1 meeting the condition 1− d 1.
Fechner’s description of the stimulus-sensation relationship was dominating for a hun-
dred years until Stanley Smith Stevens (1906–1973) put forward a new psychophysical
law [9, 10] called after him Stevens’ law. When subjects are asked to quantify (numeri-
cally or, e.g., via squeezing a handgrip dynamometer) their sense of subjective intensity
the M(S)-relationship is described more effectively by a power law
M = kSβs , (3)
where the coefficient k and the exponent βs are some constants determined by the phys-
iological mechanisms of the corresponding sensory modality. The Stevens exponent βs
can be less or larger than or equal to 1, e.g., for visual length of lines, brightness, and
loudness βs = 1.0, 0.5, and 0.67, respectively, for electric shock βs = 3.5 [e.g., 2].
The appearance of two different laws competing for the description of the stimulus-
sensation relationship gave rise to long-term debates in psychophysics including the
present time. These debates are focused on the possibility of reconciling Fechner’s law
and Steven’s law because both of them being the vary basic laws of psychophysic, on
one hand, concern quantifying the inner sensation of external physical stimuli and, on
the other hand, have functionally different forms; I call this issue the Fechner-Stevens
dilemma for short. Broadly speaking, the subject of these debates may be interpreted
as to whether it is possible that the two forms of the relationship M = M(S) given by
Fechner’s law and Stevens’ law are really mathematically equivalent over some range of
external stimulus intensity [11, Chap. 3]. It should be noted that this dilemma can be
also posed at a high level of describing the human mind in dealing with cultural aspects
of human society [12, 13].
Almost immediately after Stevens’ publication, MacKay [14] proposed the concept
of the relationship between the intensity S of physical stimulus and the perceived mag-
nitude M (the internal activity) via the neural network in order to reconcile the two
laws with each other. Namely, accepting the neuron operating frequencies caused by the
stimulus intensity and the brain internal activity to be related to S and M via Fech-
ner’s logarithmic law and the stimulus-sensation comparison to be implemented via a
linear relationship of the two frequencies, MacKay comes directly to Stevens’ law (3).
Similar ideas were considered also in [15, 16], in addition see [17, 18] for their discus-
sion. Nowadays this concept has developed into a branch of science that could be called
neural psychophysics focusing its attention on neural mechanisms governing human in-
ner perception of physical stimulus [for a review see, e.g., 19, 20, 21, 22, and references
therein].
Another approach to tackling the Fechner-Stevens dilemma is to modify Weber’s law
in the vicinity of some special points accompanied by additional modifications in the
understanding of how the internal sense of physical stimuli is formed with the increase in
the stimulus intensity. The discussion of this approach was induced by publication [23]
followed by a large number of commentaries published in the same journal; for a review
see, e.g., [24, 25, 26].
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The crucial point in the psychophysics development playing an essential role in my
further constructions is related to the idea of converting the description of stimulus-
sensation regularities from outer psychophysics to inner psychophysics posed by Go¨sta
Ekman (1920–1971) [27]. Instead of dealing with the intensity of physical stimuli he
proposed to analyze the basic laws of human sensation in terms of sensory magnitudes.
In particular, he demonstrated that the relationship between the variation of magnitude
∆M matching the just-noticeable difference ∆S of the corresponding physical stimulus
and the sensory magnitude obeys the law
∆M = κeM (4)
similar to Weber’s law (1) in form. Relationship (4) is often referred to as Ekman’s
law and below the coefficient κe will be called Ekman fraction. It should be noted that
Ekman’s law as a conjecture was put forward by Franz Brentano (1838–1917) whose work
influenced also the development of phenomenology as a branch of philosophy [28].
Keeping in mind my further constructions I want to emphasize that Ekman’s law:
• presents a series obstacle to Fechner’s logarithmic interpretation of the stimulus-
sensation relationship based on Weber’s law,
• is regarded as an immediate consequence of Weber’s law and Stevens’s law [e.g.,
24].
As far as the latter item is concerned, the three laws are, in fact, not mutually inde-
pendent. Weber’s law admits much more reliable way of verification in comparison with
Ekman’s law. Nevertheless, below I will regard Ekman’s law to be the basic one whereas
Weber’s law to be a consequence because Ekman’s law can be explicitly attributed to
inner psychophysics directly dealing with the mind.
3. Universality of inner psychophysics
The model to be developed turns to Ekman’s law as well as a number of hypotheses
about the universality of inner psychophysics put forward by Robert Teghtsoonian (1932–
2017). Based on the experimental data summarized, in particular, by Poulton [29, 30] and
using the notion of dynamic range—the span (usually given in log-units) from the lowest
to highest stimulus intensities or sensory magnitudes admitting a continuous grading—
Teghtsoonian claims that [31, 32, 33]:
1. The Ekman fraction, in contrast to the Weber fraction, is approximately the same
value equal to κe = 0.03 for the main sensory modalities, which assumes the strict
relationship βs = βs(κw) between the Weber fraction and the Stevens exponent.
2. A wide variety of perceptual continua are characterized by a common maximal
dynamic range RM of sensory magnitude with the estimate logRM ∼ 1.5.
3. Crossmodal property. The maximal dynamic range RS of stimulus intensity and
the Stevens exponent βs are related such that the product βs · logRS = logRM is
an approximately constant value.
4. Intramodal properties. In quantifying two stimuli within a given perceptual contin-
uum the ratio rS of their intensities and the ratio rM of their sensory magnitudes
are related via the expression log rM = βs · log rS + k where the constant k ∼ 0.1.
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Broadly speaking, humans, on the average, tend to constrict the subjective dynamic
range in quantifying physical stimuli. In particular:
• Within a fixed range of test stimuli the magnitude estimates are systematically
biased towards the center of the tested range as it has been figured out and
studied previously by Hollingworth [34] and Stevens & Greenbaum [35]. This
bias called the regression effect causes an underestimation of large magnitudes
and an overestimation of small ones. The underestimation and overestimations
of long and short time intervals, respectively, was recognized even earlier by
Karl von Vierordt (1818–1884), which is reflected in his famous book The
Experimental Study of the Time Sense (English translation) (1868) [e.g., 36,
for details].
• This bias towards the center becomes more pronounced with increasing mag-
nitudes, which is called the range effect [32, 33].
To complete this description of the basic psychophysical properties I have added the
following item accumulating the results of other scholars.
5. Judgments on perceived magnitudes are also affected by the recent history of eval-
uating physical stimuli belonging to the same perceptual continuum or, even, def-
erent one, which is often called sequential effects. Their various aspects were thor-
oughly studied in the last century and for a recent review a reader may be referred,
e.g., to [37, 38, 39, 40]. In particular, the sequential effects give rise to hysteresis
in stimulus evaluation. It means that the sensory magnitude ascribed to a given
stimulus by an observer can be different when the given stimulus is approaches
from stimuli of higher or weaker intensity [9, 41].
As far as Proposition 1 is concerned with, the analysis of a wider collection of experi-
mental data by Laming [24] demonstrates that the Ekman fraction obtained in the way
used by Teghtsoonian [31] can deviate substantially from the value κe = 0.03. It poses
doubts about the existence of a strict relationship between Weber’s law of sensory dis-
crimination and Stevens’s law of sensory judgment [24]. Below I argue for its existence
and relate the scattering of calculated values of the Ekman fraction to the use of data
obtained at the boundary of judgment possibility.
The aforementioned properties enabled Teghtsoonian [31, 32, 42] to posit a single cen-
tral macrolevel mechanism responsible for all judgments of sensory magnitude. Within
this mechanisms the role of various receptor systems is reduced to performing the nec-
essary expansions or compressions required to map the widely varying dynamic ranges
of physical stimuli into the constant range of subjective magnitudes. The similarity be-
tween human perception of physical stimuli based on our sense organs and the mental
evaluation of abstract objects like numbers [43, 44, 45, 46, 47] is an additional argument
for this mechanism.
The data accumulated in fMRI, EEG, and neuropsychological investigations also ar-
gue for this central mechanism. In particular Walsh and Bueti [48, 49] put forward a new
paradigm about human judgment and evaluation of external stimuli called ATOM (“A
Theory Of Magnitude”). The ATOM supposes that various dimensions of magnitude
information, such as space, time, and quantity, are encoded by “common neural metrics”
in the parietal cortex, which explains the emergence of common neurocognitive mecha-
nisms governing human perception of various physical stimuli. Naturally, the situation
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can be more complex [50]. For a review of arguments for and against this universality
a reader may be referred to [51, 52, 53]. Moreover Hayes et al. [54] generalized the
ATOM by extending its scope onto memory, reasoning, and categorization traditionally
treated as separate components of human cognition. The exemplar-based account of
the relationship between categorization and recognition [55] is also rather close to this
paradigm.
The following premises accepted nowadays in psychophysic also underlies the concept
of central mechanism of stimulus evaluation. First, the stimulus perception is considered
to be implemented into two steps: the conversion of physical stimuli into neural signals
by sense organs (perceptual subsystem) and the mental evaluation of these signals based
on the central subsystem functioning. After Fechner, Treisman [15] seems to be the first
who supposes the perceptual and central subsystems to be governed by their own laws.
Naturally, the two subsystems mutually affect each other [see, e.g., 56, for a review and
the discussion of similar concepts]. This type description, in particular, was proposed in
[57, 58] where the role of human memory is accentuated.
The second premise focuses attention on the cognitive evaluation of perceived stimuli
where the introduction of psychological space takes the central place. The concept of psy-
chological space is rooted in the works of Louis Leon Thurstone (1887–1955) formulated
the law of comparative judgment converted then into the law of categorical judgment by
Warren S. Torgerson (1924–1999). However the psychological space as an object ad-
mitting sophisticated mathematical description appears in the works by Robert Duncan
Luce (1925–2012) [e.g., 59, 60, 61, 62, also [63] for a general discussion]. The gist of
these constructions is the use of the probabilistic properties of human decision-making in
categorizing various external stimuli for constructing the topology of the inner psycholog-
ical space, whose points are various categories. Exactly the introduction of psychological
space with own properties and governing the final step in stimulus evaluation explains the
universality of psychophysical laws for all the sensory modalities [e.g., 64, 65, 66, 67, 68].
Among the recent publications this universality has been also discussed, e.g., in [69, 70]
and [71, 72, 73]. In this connection I want to note the Bayesian approach to describing
the interaction between the perceptual and central subsystems as well as their individual
operations turning to the formalism of conditional probabilities [74, 75, for review]. The
psychological space can be also introduced axiomatically [e.g., 76, 77].
The third premise concerns the nonlinear properties of inner representation of exter-
nal stimuli. In particular, it posits that the uncertainty in evaluating sensory magnitudes
is determined mainly by the functioning of the central subsystem rather than the prop-
erties of noise attributed to the corresponding physical stimulus and the physiological
transformation of physical effects into neural signals by sense organs. Petrov and An-
derson [57, 58] allow for this nonlinearity endowing the relationship between the sensory
magnitude M and the physical stimulus intensity S with an additive noise whose ampli-
tude depends on the sensory magnitude itself. Their model is based on the interpretation
of Weber’s law (1) by Ekman [27] which considers the just-noticeable differences ∆S to be
caused by perceptual noise additively entering the relationship S 7→ M with amplitude
proportional to the mean value of sensory magnitude,
〈(δM)2〉1/2 = κe〈M〉 , (5)
which is probabilistic interpretation of Ekman’s law (4). Petrov’s model accepts the
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relationship between the sensory magnitude and physical stimulus to be of the form
M = kSβs(1 + κeξ) . (6)
Here ξ is a noise of unit amplitude. Assuming the noise contribution to the sensory
magnitude to be small and the just-noticeable differences ∆S to be specified by the
amplitude of the random fluctuations in the sensory magnitude, Exp. (6) immediately
gives rise to Weber’s law (1) with κw ∼ κe/βs. The probabilistic concepts turning, in
particular, to the notion of entropy have been used to model psychophysical regularities
[e.g., 11, 78, 79, 80].
4. Goal of the present work
The psychological space as an object with own properties attributed to it as whole
may be regarded as one of the basic elements appearing in the framework of the philo-
sophical approach to describing the human mind called phenomenology. Phenomenology
was launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger,
et al. Broadly speaking, phenomenology studies structures of conscious experience as ex-
perienced from the first-person point of view [e.g., 81, 82, for introduction]. In book [1]
following the gist of phenomenology I proposed a two-component approach to describing
human behavior and actions. This approach introduces two complementary components,
objective and subjective ones. The objective component represents the physical (outer)
world governed by the classic laws of physics. The subjective component represents our
inner world and is assumed to be governed by its own laws irreducible to the laws of
the objective components within the given phenomenological approach. For this reason
I claim that we need an individual mathematical formalism for describing mental phe-
nomena in terms that can be formulated turning to the first-person experience. As a
validation of the given approach efficiency, we may consider its feasibility of constructing
mathematical models for particular phenomena that (i) can provide us with complete,
self-consistent description, (ii) turn in their construction to the basic properties of our
mind, and (iii) minimize the number of accepted assumptions and introduced mathe-
matical notions.
In the present paper I develop a phenomenological model for human evaluation of
external physical stimuli that from a rather general standpoint explains the universality
of inner psychophysics and proposes a solution to the Fechner-Stevens dilemma. In what
follows I will confine my consideration to the prothetic (in Stevens’s terminology [9])
perceptual continua such as loudness and brightness admitting continuous variation in
the intensity of the corresponding stimuli without changes in their categorization. The
metathetic perceptual continua, e.g., color or pitch require an individual consideration.
Before passing directly to the model description it should be noted that the notion
of mental space takes the central place in the further constructions. It is similar to the
concept of psychological space discussed above. Nevertheless I prefer to use the term
mental space to emphasize that its elements—mental images of some physical objects—
are irreducible to their physical sources. Broadly speaking, within the two-component
description these mental images are entities of the subjective component.
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Figure 1: The two-step process of stimulus perception with the intermediate neural image Ns of an
external (physical) stimulus S.
5. Model
5.1. General comments
As the pivot point of the proposed concept, perception of a physical stimulus is as-
sumed to be a two-step process illustrated in Fig. 1. At the first step an external (phys-
ical) stimulus S is converted by the corresponding sense organ (perceptual subsystem)
into a neural signal Ns which can be analyzed by the central subsystem. At the second
step the central subsystem converts this neural signal into an image M—an element of
the mental space.
To avoid possible misunderstanding and expecting critical comments from reductive
physicalists I note the following. From the standpoint of reductive physicalism,2 only
neural processes appear at the basic level of description of stimulus perception. This
feature is reflected in the standard presentation of composite perception process: (i) the
conversion of physical stimuli into neural signals proceeded by the central subsystem and
then (ii) human response R caused by these signals, S 7→ N 7→ R [e.g., 57, 58].
The main difference between the standard approach and my approach is that I con-
sider separately the neural signal Ns generated by sense organs (the perceptual subsys-
tem) and, then, I introduce the mental space reflecting the brain activity responsible for
conscious evaluation of perceived stimuli.
According to reductive physicalism an epiphenomenal approach to describing human
perception of physical stimuli cannot be accepted as fundamental because it operates with
objects having no causal power. Therefore models directly dealing with mental images
of physical stimuli cannot be used for explaining the basic properties of psychophysical
laws.
Nevertheless, numerous examples from physics, Landau’s phenomenological theory of
phase transitions is one of them, demonstrate that theories dealing with, strictly speaking,
epiphenomenal entities as objects affecting directly the behavior of analyzed systems can
be highly efficient. The model I propose belongs to the class of such phenomenological
theories.
The basic advantage of the given approach is the possibility of ascribing to elements
of mental space individual properties existing on their own. In terms of two-component
description [1]
2Reductive physicalism is a philosophical account of human mind accepting that all the objects as
well as their properties are reducible to the underlying physical states and processes. As a result,
mental states and processes cannot have causal power which may be attributed only to physiological, in
particular, neural processes in the brain [see, e.g., 83].
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- physical stimuli are entities of the objective component,
- the mental space with images caused by physical stimuli is a particular instantiation
of the subjective component, and
- the neural signals directly generated by sense organs determine the interaction of
the two components.
In what follows I will analyze stimulus perception described in terms of the relationship
of the stimulus intensity S and the perceived magnitude M . The first quantity, S, is
ascribed to the analyzed physical stimulus, the second one, M , is attributed to the image
of this stimulus in the mental space. The neural signal of intensity N generated by the
corresponding sense organ responding to the stimulus S is considered, on one side, to
be completely determined by the external stimulus, N = N(S), and, on the other side,
to play the role of a source for the image M emerging in the mental space. The main
attention will be focused on the emergence of such images, whereas the N(S)-relationship
merely reflecting the underlying physiological processes is specified by the ansatz
N = Ap · Sβp (7)
where Ap and βp are some constants. Relationship (7) may be regarded as the physio-
logical component of Steven’s law. Its nonlinearity (for βp 6= 1) allows for the possibility
of the perceptual system adaptation to the specific conditions of environment, in partic-
ular, to the intensity of external stimuli [see, e.g., 3, for the discussion of physiological
mechanisms of various sensory modalities from the standpoint of psychophysics]. When
there are no special sense organs perceiving a give type of physical stimuli the neural
signal N can be generated by some internal mechanism. In particular, it is the case for
time perception and its implementation can be based on internal physiological “clocks”
[e.g., 84, for an introduction to the perception of time]. This situation is also allowed
for by expression (7) with βp = 1, i.e., where the physical stimulus intensity S and the
amplitude N of neural signals may be identified within some proportionality. For time
perception the number of internal clock ticks and the duration of time interval exemplify
this proportionality.
5.2. Mental space
The image M emerging in the mental space after processing a certain neural signal
N is the main object to be discussed in the remaining part of the present paper. It is
assumed to possess the following properties.
P1: The image M bears a certain information about the amplitude N of signal N. It
does not mean that this information is coded in units specifying various physio-
logical features of signal N. The form of coding may be rather abstract and rid of
many particular details characterizing the spatio-temporal structure of the neural
signal N. For this reason the image M is assumed to possess some property called
magnitude representing in some way the amplitude N of neural signal. Naturally
there could be other aspects of the image M representing other features of neural
signal, i.e., the information about sensory modality.
P2: After the emergence caused by the neural signal N, the image M no longer needs
the signal N to be present. So mental images of physical stimuli are individual
10
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Figure 2: The mental image M with magnitude M as the M(m)-cloud—a fuzzy segment with blurred
boundary on the m-axis. The fuzziness of the image boundary ∂M(n/M,∆) is specified by function (8),
in this illustration the parameter ∆ = 1/8 corresponding to the boundary thickness of 25% was used.
objects existing on their own in the mental space, which implies the memory-based
nature of the mental space. The introduction of stimulus images in this way opens
a gate to modeling their own dynamics in the memory.
P3: Due to our consideration being confined to a certain prothetic perceptual contin-
uum (e.g., loudness) the corresponding images admit direct comparison with one
another based only on their magnitudes because other aspects of these images (e.g.,
sound frequency) reflecting the nature of the given perceptual continuum and the
corresponding sensory modality can be the same.
P4: The image M possesses a certain universal structure represented in Fig. 2. On
the axis of magnitudes (further the m-axis) the image M is represented as some
fuzzy region—theM(m)-cloud—with blurred boundary of thickness ∆ centered at
a point M . The distance between the m-axis origin and the latter point is referred
to as the magnitude M of the image M.
The M(m)-clouds is characterized by two parameters: the image magnitude M
and the relative thickness ∆ of its boundary ∂M specified as a function ∂M(m/M,∆)
except for possible cofactors arising via integration over the m-axis under certain
conditions. Besides, keeping in mind the general features of this type blur and the
further use of the given function in the image comparison I accept two additional
assumptions.
– The function ∂M(m/M,∆) is supposed to be symmetric with respect to the
argument exchange m↔M , i.e., m/M ↔M/m.
– The relative thickness ∆ of the boundary ∂M is considered to be a small
parameter, ∆  1. So in further mathematical manipulations I may confine
them to the leading order in ∆.
Turning to the general properties of the function ∂M(m/M,∆) attaining its max-
imum at m = M the following ansatz
∂M(m/M,∆) = 1√
Z(M∆)Z(m∆)
exp
{
−B(m/M,∆)
}
, (8)
11
where
B(m/M,∆) =
1
2∆2
(m−M)2
mM
=
1
2∆2
[√
m
M
−
√
M
m
]2
(9)
is accepted for the boundary fuzziness. The cofactors {Z(. . .)} are specified by the
equality
〈M|M〉 def=
∞∫
0
[∂M(m/M,∆)]2dm = 1 , (10)
imposed on the image M. Whence it follows that in the leading order in ∆
Z(M∆) =
(√
piM∆
)1/2
, Z(m∆) =
(√
pim∆
)1/2
(11)
Leaping ahead, I note that equality (10) admits interpretation such as “any image
always coincides with itself.”
P5: Strictly speaking, when we deal with different images in the mental space the magni-
tude M of image M cannot be used as just a number to analyze their interrelations
directly. Nevertheless, attributing magnitudes to these images should enable us
to introduce the following two general operations implemented consciously in the
mind:
a) A qualitative comparison of two images M1 and M2 with respect to which one
has a smaller or larger magnitude, or whether their magnitudes are identical,
i.e.,3
M1 ≺M2 , M1 M2 , M1 'M2 . (12)
I have used the symbols “≺,” “,” and “'” to denote these interrelations
instead of “<,” “>,” and “=” in order to avoid a possible confusion between
the introduced relations and the standard relations of real numbers.
b) A certain scaling of the image amplitudes to be called the image fusion de-
termined by the structure of these images
n⊗M1 7→Mn where n is an integer. (13)
It is worthy of noting that the possibility of ascribing such properties to results of mental
operations with perceived physical stimuli is due to the introduction of mental space as
some individual object with its own properties.
3Strictly speaking, the inference that a given pair of images are incommensurable in principle may
be also introduced as a plausible result of qualitative comparison. However this generalization desires
an individual consideration.
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5.3. Comparison of adjacent images: Ekman’s law
When two physical stimuli affect the perceptual subsystem simultaneously there could
be a certain physiological mechanism enabling their comparison with higher accuracy
than, e.g., in the case when these stimuli are separated by some time gap and their
comparison requires memory.
In the case of simultaneous stimuli their images M1 and M2 are supposed to be
adjacent to each other in the mental space and the arguments m1 and m2 of their clouds
may be identified. It enables us to calculate 〈M1|M2〉 following the standard rule:
〈M1|M2〉 =
∞∫
0
∂M1(m)∂M2(m) dm (14)
and quantify the proximity of the two images using this value. According to the premise P4
both the cloudsM1(m),M2(m) should possess the same structure with identical relative
thickness of their boundaries, ∆1 = ∆2
def
= ∆e/
√
2. Indeed, at the moment of stimulus
action, on one hand, theM(m)-cloud formation has to be enslaved by the physical stim-
ulus and, on the other hand, its form is determined by the properties of mental space.
The two statements can be reconciled with each other assuming that the physical stimuli
determine the magnitudes of their images whereas the form of M(m)-clouds is deter-
mined by the properties of mental space that are not affected by memory effects and
reflect only the current neural signals generated by the perceptual subsystem. Direct
calculations based on Exp. (8) within the leading order in ∆e yield
〈M1|M2〉 = exp
{−B(M1/M2,∆e)} . (15)
In probabilistic terms this expression admits the interpretation as the probability of
classifying the images M1(m), M2(m) as equivalent in magnitude and the function
B(M1/M2,∆e) may be regarded as the potential measure of image proximity or just
the proximity potential for short.
The obtained result allows us also to estimate the just noticeable difference in the
image magnitudes of simultaneous stimuli, δM , setting
B
[
(M + δM)/M,∆e
]
. 1 .
Whence it follows that
δM
M
def
= κe ∼ ∆e , (16)
which is Ekman’s law. The available experimental data for the Ekman fraction κe ≈ 0.03
discussed above give the numerical estimate for the parameter ∆e in the case of currently
active stimuli.
The obtained expressions for the proximity of two images in magnitude illustrate the
basic formalism to be developed for more general situations.
5.4. Memory-based image comparison
Mental operations with images, e.g., creating mental copies of an image M, retaining
an active stimulus image in memory and retrieving it later changes the states of these
13
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Figure 3: Illustration of image transformation Ĝ related, e.g., to mental operations with images in
copying, retaining to and retrieving from memory.
images and thus can affect both the M(n)-cloud characteristics, the magnitude M and
the relative measure ∆ of cloud blur. Unconscious change in the magnitude M should be
regarded as some bias, which lies outside the present analysis. Here I focus our attention
on changes in ∆.
Such mental operations may be treated as the movement of theM(n)-cloud between
different states of the image M, i.e., between different points of subspace composed of
the possible image states. Figure 3 illustrates this operation. In general, this operation
can be written in the form
∂M2
(
m/M,∆2
)
= Ĝ
[
∂M1
(
m/M,∆1
)]
. (17)
Accepting that
- the individual blur Ĝ(m) of points m ∈M caused by the given transformation and
the original M1(m)-cloud as a whole are governed by the same mechanism and
- the superposition principle for the overlapping of images Ĝ(m′) and Ĝ(m′′) in the
formation of the M2(m)-cloud holds
transformation (17) can be represented in the linear form4
∂M2
(
m/M,∆2
)
=
∞∫
0
dm′G(m,m′|∆G) · ∂M1
(
m′/M,∆1
)
, (18)
where ∆G is a given parameter of this transformation and
G(m,m′|∆G) ∝
∞∫
0
dM ′ ∂M(m/M ′, 1√
2
∆G
) · ∂M(m′/M ′, 1√
2
∆G
)
.
Whence it follows that the transformation Ĝ can be reduced to the renormalization of
the relative thickness of image boundary
Ĝ : M1(m) 7→ M2(m)⇒ ∆2 =
√
∆21 + ∆
2
G . (19)
4The detailed construction of this transformation deserves an individual analysis to be published
somewhere else.
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where the parameter ∆G admits the interpretation as an additional blur caused by
memory-based mental operations and attributed to the memory on its own.
For simplicity, the memory-caused blur ∆G  ∆e will be regarded as a fixed param-
eter for all the mental operations with just emerged images. Therefore all the images
except for just emerged ones will be characterized by a relative boundary thickness
∆m/
√
2  ∆e. In this case the memory-based comparison of images M1 and M2 is
specified by the probability
〈M1|M2〉 = exp
{−B(M1/M2,∆m)} (20)
of their equality in magnitude. Here the proximity potential B(M1/M2,∆m) is again
specified by Exp. (9).
The similarity of Exps. (15) and (20) within the replacement ∆e ↔ ∆m enables me
to employ the same formalism for describing the image comparison when the physical
stimuli are active simultaneously or it is based on memory. The case of comparing images
different in the relative thickness of their boundaries, ∆1 6= ∆2, requires an individual
consideration. The comparison of images when one of them is caused by the currently
active stimuli and the other is retrieved from memory exemplifies the latter case.
5.5. Image qualitative comparison
The relations “≺,” “,” and “'” between two images M1, M2 are specified as follows.
Using the proximity potential B(M1/M2,∆e,m) the equality of two images M1 and M2
in magnitude, M1 'M2, is accepted with the probability
P eq12 = exp
{−B(M1/M2,∆e,m)}. (21)
When the equality of these images is rejected, the probability of this event is 1 − P eq12 ,
the right relation between the magnitudes, M1 < M2 or M1 > M2 is selected. In other
words, for a given pair of images M1 and M2
M1 'M2 with the probability P eq12 ,
M1 ≺M2 with the probability 1− P eq12 for M1 < M2, (22)
M1 M2 with the probability 1− P eq12 for M1 > M2,
where the probability P eq12 is given by the proximity potential, Exp. (21).
5.6. Integer fusion of images
Rejecting the feasibility of quantifying image magnitudes relative to one another in
the standard way, I loose the possibility of introducing the addition and subtraction
operations with images. There is only one exception, it is the combination (fusion) of
several images of the same magnitude (or seeming equal in magnitude) into one image
made within one step (Fig. 4):
n⊗M1 7→Mn implying nM1 = Mn in the sense of relations (22), (23)
where n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , nc is some integer. This procedure, however, cannot not be
introduced for any integer, it is justified only for integers less than or equal to some
critical value nc. As illustrated in Fig. 4, image fusion changes the scales but not the
15
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Figure 4: Illustration of image fusion: three similar images {M1} (three copies of one image) are merged
into the image M3. The image fusion changes the scales but not the form of images.
form of images, in particular, the value of ∆m. Because the given fusion is based on
mental operations—mental copy of images and then conversion of their combination into
one image—their boundary fuzziness is set equal to ∆m/
√
2. So the conscious control
over the image fusion is feasible only when the uncertainty δMn of the result is less than
the individual magnitude M1 of the constituent components. In other words, we should
recognize the difference of fusing n and n + 1 images for this operation to be feasible.
Whence it follows that the maximal number nc of similar images that can fused is related
to ∆m as
nc ∆m ∼ 1 . (24)
According to the results to be discussed further and turning to our causal experience the
value of nc can be estimated as nc ∼ 4–6.
The constructed expressions and the found estimates of the model parameters enable
me to analyze particular phenomena and compare numerically the results of the proposed
model with experimental data outlined in Sec. 3.
6. Qualitative bisection and its generalization to ternary choice
Let us analyze the bisection problem and related issues employing the developed
formalism for image comparison. Within the classical bisection task subjects are asked
to classify a trial stimulus with respect to its proximity to one of two given stimuli from
the same perceptual continuum. This task matches the bisection problem concerning
the image 〈M〉 whose magnitude 〈M〉 admits the interpretation as the mean value of
the magnitudes M1 and M2 of other two images M1 and M2. Below in this section I
will assume that M1 ≺ M2, because for the bisection problem to have some sense the
qualitative difference between the two images has to be well recognizable.
The particular expression for 〈M〉 depends on several factors, with two of them playing
crucial roles. First, it is whether a subject evaluates the difference between the magni-
tudes M1 and a trial m, on one side, and m and M2, on the other side, qualitatively, i.e.,
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without any attempt to compare these differences quantitatively. For this reason I use
the term qualitative bisection to refer to such image (signal) comparison. As clear from
the results of Sec. 8, the quantitative comparison can become rather problematic if the
ratio M2/M1 . 2.
The second crucial factor is whether a subject is able to quantify the magnitude M2
in units of M1. If not so, the contribution of the magnitude M1 into the value of 〈M〉
is just ignorable and the subject can quantitatively construct the image 〈M〉 with the
magnitude 〈M〉 ≈M2/2. Under such conditions the magnitude 〈M〉 may be classified as
the arithmetic mean. According to Sec. 3 it is the case when the ratio of their magnitudes
exceeds nc, i.e., M2 & ncM1.
Within the qualitative bisection problem the proximity potentialB is used to quantify
the nearness of two images, which leads to the definition of the mean value 〈M〉 as a
magnitude meeting the condition
B
(
m
M1
,∆m
)∣∣∣∣
m=〈M〉
= B
(
M2
m
,∆m
)∣∣∣∣
m=〈M〉
, (25)
whence it directly follows that
〈M〉 = 〈M〉g def=
√
M1M2 . (26)
Thereby the qualitative bisection is characterized by the geometric mean.
It is worthy of noting that arguments giving rise to equality (26) are not new, at least,
they are met in publications by Luce [61, 85]. What concerns available experimental
data for stimulus bisections, let us turn to psychophysics of time perception because
the magnitude of perceived duration and the real duration of various stimuli are rather
similar [84, for a review]. A meta-analysis of classification data [86] reports that the
bisection point lies near the geometric mean for ratios of referent duration about 2 or
less and lies near the arithmetic mean for ratios of 4 or greater. The noted values of
referent ratio fit well the value of nc estimated above as nc ∼ 4–6. For a detailed review
of the modern state of the art in this field a reader may be referred to Ref. [87].
The qualitative bisection problem admits a certain generalization when a given mag-
nitude m has to be classified according to its proximity to one of two magnitudes M1
and M2 (M1 < m < M2), whereas
- the difference between the trial magnitude m and both of the classification magni-
tudes M1 and M2 is clearly recognized, i.e.,
Bi = B(m/Mi,∆m) 1 (i = 1, 2),
- there is no other initially given magnitude between M1 and M2 that can be used
as a classification value.
This situation can be met in quantitative comparison of images, so let us analyze it here
in more details.
Referring to Exp. (21) as some analogy to the analyzed problem the binary choice
between M1 and M2 is described by the probability of choosing Mi (i = 1, 2) equal to
Pi =
1
Z
e−Bi (27)
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where the normalizing coefficient Z is specified by the expression
Z = e−B1 + e−B2
because only the two options are available for selection. However, although no other
options are given initially there is, nevertheless, another universal choice tacitly present.
It is to reject both the options M1 and M2 when B1,B2  1. If, in any case, the
choice of some classification magnitude has to be made, the selection of “something”
between M1 and M2 can be used as the implementation of this choice. It introduces a
new classification option—some mean value 〈M〉12—in consideration. Leaping ahead, I
note that this value may be identified with the geometric mean (26) but the proximity
potential B(m/
√
M1M2,∆) formally constructed for m and 〈M〉g cannot be used here
to quantify the nearness of the trial magnitude m to the value 〈M〉g. The matter is that
according to the initial conditions there can be no image created in some way whose
magnitude is between the values M1 and M2. Thereby no specific magnitude can be
attributed to the “something” between M1 and M2. So in describing the choice of the
mean value 〈M〉g as the alternative class of magnitude classification I am allowed to deal
only with the quantities B1(m) and B2(m) considered, maybe, for all the possible values
of trial magnitude, m ∈ [M1,M2].
Let us introduce the value Bg called, by analogy, the proximity potential to describe
the choice of 〈M〉g in the same way as it is done for the magnitudes M1 and M2. Namely,
let the probability of choosing 〈M〉g be
Pg =
1
Z
e−Bg (28)
where now by virtue of Exps. (27) and (28) the normalization coefficient Z is specified
by the expression
Z = e−B1 + e−B2 + e−Bg . (29)
In order to construct a plausible form of the dependence Bg[B1,B2] I note the follow-
ing. For the general reasons when, e.g., B1  1, the use of the mean value class is
not necessary, which can be taken into account expecting that Bg  1 in this case.
Otherwise, when B1,B2  1 the choice of 〈M〉g may be dominant, which implies the
inequality Bm  B1,B2 to hold. Finally, when the trial magnitude m ∼ 〈M〉g and
B1(m) ∼ B2(m) ∼ 1, selecting all the three magnitude classes must be equiprobable,
i.e., Bg ∼ 1 also. If for such trial magnitudes m the values B1(m) ∼ B2(m)  1 the
proximity potential Bg(m) (i) has to take small values, Bg  1, and (ii) should be the
minimum achieved by the function Bg(m) for m ∈ [M1.M2].
The following simple ansatz
Bg(m) =
B20
2
[
1
B1(m)
+
1
B2(m)
]
(30)
meets all these requirements. Here I have introduced the additional parameter B0 play-
ing the role of fuzzy threshold evaluating the proximity potentials B1(m) and B2(m)
when the contribution of the mean value choice becomes remarkable. In the preceding
argumentation this threshold was tacitly set equal to unity because of exponential de-
crease of probability (27) for Bi  1. However, there could be other reasons for turning
to this option.
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Figure 5: Qualitative bisection problem generalized to the ternary choice between two initially given
magnitudes M1, M2 and their mean value 〈M〉g as the rejection of both the options M1, M2. In
plotting the proximity potentialsB1(m), B2(m), andBg(m) based on Exps. (9), (21), (30) the parameter
1/(2∆2m) = 8 and B0 = 1 were used, which corresponds to (M2/M1)c ≈ 2.02
Figure 5 illustrates the transition from practically the binary choice to the situation
where the contribution of the mean-value option is crucial. As follows from Exp. (30)
there is a critical ratio rc = (M2/M1)c of magnitudes specified by the expression
rc =
1
4
(
∆m
√
B0 +
√
2 + ∆2mB0
)4
, (31)
such that for M2/M1 < rc the choice between the magnitudes M1 and M2 does not imply
a substantial contribution of the mean-value option. If M2/M1 > rc, the choice of any of
the classification magnitudes M1 and M2 at least for m ∼ 〈M〉g is not relevant and the
possibility of referring to the mean value as a classification option becomes essential.
When the choice of alternatives to the initially given options is not feasible the de-
veloped model can be employed for describing the rejection of the choice at all. We will
meet this situation further when two magnitudes M1 and M2 that should be compared
quantitatively become incommensurable.
7. Direct quantitative comparison of images: Bounded rational arithmetic
Quantitative comparison of two images M1, M2 with respect to their magnitudes
M1 and M2 requires some mental operation giving the ratio M1/M2 as a number. The
possibility of implementing such operations unconsciously, at least, concerning their main
steps seems to be doubtful because mental images are certain objects of mental space
rather than abstract numbers. Contrarily, relations (12) and integer fusion (13) deal with
images as whole objects, so the introduction of these operations at the general level of
mental space description is acceptable.
In the present section I demonstrate that the desired quantitative comparison of im-
ages admits a conscious implementation based on the two operations using some common
unit—an image 1 commensurable with the analyzed images.
Let us consider two images M1 and M2 of magnitudes M1 and M2 representing
stimuli of the same perceptual continuum and a similar trial image 1 of amplitude ` to
be used as a common unit for quantifying the two ones. Independently of whether the
19
analyzed images are caused by currently active stimuli or, at least one of them is retrieved
from memory, the image fusion is a pure mental operation. Therefore for describing the
relationship between these images the proximity potential B(. . . ,∆m) will be employed
in further analysis.
The direct quantitative comparison of the two images M1 and M2 via the trial unit 1
is based on the attempt:
- to fuse n1 copies of 1 and n2 copies of 1,
- to compare pairwise the results and the images M1 and M2 qualitatively with
respect to their equality in magnitude and then
- to find the optimal configuration {M1,M2, `, n1, n2} which determines the quanti-
tative estimation of magnitude ratio(
M2
M1
)
e
def
=
n2
n1
∣∣∣∣
opt
.
The following diagram
n1 ⊗ 1 'M1 ←−−−− 1 −−−−→ n2 ⊗ 1 'M2y
M1 −−−−→ |〉 · n2
n1
−−−−→ M2
(32)
illustrates this procedure. The appropriate choice of trial units ensures the integers n1
and n2 to be relatively prime. Besides they must meet the inequality
n1, n2 ≤ nc . (33)
required for the integer fusion of images to be well defined. The latter inequality is the
reason to call the given procedure the magnitude quantification within bounded rational
arithmetic.
By virtue of (9) and (21) the probability P(n1, n2, `) of considering the images M1
and M2 equivalent in magnitude based on the operations shown in diagram (32) is given
by the expression
P(n1, n2, `) = exp
{− B`(n1, n2)}, (34)
where the `-dependent proximity potential B` is composed of two terms
B`(n1, n2) = 1
2∆2m
[√
M1
n1`
−
√
n1`
M1
]2
+
1
2∆2m
[√
M2
n2`
−
√
n2`
M2
]2
. (35)
Due to estimate (24) and condition (33) acceptable variations of ` near its optimal value
`opt =
√
M1
n1
M2
n2
matching the minimum of B` are less than `opt/nc, which allows us to use the replacement
ni`→ ni`opt (i = 1, 2) in Exp. (35). In this way we get the probability P of quantifying
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the image amplitudes M1 and M2 in terms of the identity M1/M2 ' n1/n2 via the
equality
P
(n1
n2
∣∣∣M1
M2
,∆m
)
def
=
1
Z
exp
{−Bn(ρ,∆m)}, (36)
where the proximity potential Bn of the configuration {n1, n2} is specified by the ex-
pression
Bn(ρ,∆m) =
1
∆2m
[
ρ1/4 − 1
ρ1/4
]2
with ρ =
M1
M2
· n2
n1
≈ 1
4∆2m
[√
ρ− 1√
ρ
]2
for ∆m  1 (37)
and the normalization factor Z is determined by the collection of possible configurations
{n1, n2} ∈ C of relatively prime integers:
Z =
∑
{n1,n2}∈C
exp
{−Bn(ρn,∆m)} . (38)
The collection C of possible configurations is bounded by condition (33) imposed on the
integers n1 and n2 such that their maximal ratio is nc. Therefore in the given way only
magnitudes M1 and M2 obeying the condition
max
(
M2
M1
)
. nc
can be quantitatively compared.
This interval of magnitudes admitting the quantitative comparison can be expanded
within the same formalism. In the presented approach several copies of a trial unit 1
were fused for qualitative comparison with the images M1 and M2. So its magnitude `
cannot exceed the minimal value of the magnitudes M1 and M2, let it be M1. However
this comparison may be also implemented via merging several copies of M1 for qualitative
comparison with a trial unit 1.5 The given situation is described by the same formalism
within the replacement
M1
n1
→M1n1 . (39)
Thereby, the direct quantitative comparison of two images M1 and M2 is possible when
max
(
M2
M1
)
. n2c . (40)
Here I have used the symbol . rather than ≤ to emphasize that the boundary of this
interval is blurred in some way.
The images meeting condition (40) will be called directly commensurable or just com-
mensurable for short, otherwise they are incommensurable. The value n2c will be also
5It should be noted that the case when both the images M1 and M1 are merged for pairwise qualitative
comparison with a trial unit 1 is reduced to the initially analyzed situation within the replacement
n1 ↔ n2.
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referred to as the capacity of direct quantitative comparison of images or just the com-
mensurability capacity.
The following diagram generalizing (32) illustrates the direct quantitative comparison
of images M1 and M2 and the possible choice of trial configurations
a) n1 ⊗ 1 'M1
b) n1 ⊗M1 ' 1
←−−−− 1 −−−−→ n2 ⊗ 1 'M2y 1≤n1≤n2.nc
M1 −−−−→ |〉 ×
a)
n2
n1
b) n1 · n2
−−−−→ M2
(41)
Summarizing these results, the direct quantitative comparison of two images M1, M2
with amplitudes M1, M2 admits the following probabilistic description:
• The possible pairs {n1, n2} of integers from the interval [1, nc] make up the collec-
tion of quantities {rn} = {n2/n1}
⋃{n1 ·n2} which may be used for the quantitative
comparison of the amplitudes M1, M2.
• The fitness of a given quantity rn for estimating the magnitude ratio M2/M1 is
determined by the proximity potentialBn described by Exp. (37) or its modification
within replacement (39). The probability Pn of selecting the given quantity rn is
specified by Bn according to Exp. (36).
• If the most probable quantity roptn (M2/M1) is characterized by a large value of
its proximity potential Bn & B0 then the set {rn} has to be extended to include
the mean-value option as wall as the possibility of rejecting the feasibility of the
magnitude quantitative comparison at all.
Leaping ahead, I note that this probabilistic model for image comparison can also de-
scribe the hysteresis in quantifying the magnitude relationship after a minor modification
allowing for the decision inertia [e.g., 88, 89].
8. Commensurability capacity and inner psychophysics
Expression (40) for the capacity of direct quantitative comparison of images enables
me, first, to justify Teghtsoonian’s estimate of the dynamic range RM of sensory mag-
nitude common for many perceptual continua, logRM ∼ 1.5 (Sec. 3, Proposition 2).
According to the accepted definition, the dynamic range of sensory magnitudes is the
span from the lowest to highest magnitudes of a given perceptual continuum admitting
a continuous grading. In the terms of developed model the dynamic range RM is just
the maximal ratio of magnitudes admitting direct quantitative comparison, so
RM ∼ n2c . (42)
Setting here RM ≈ 101.5 I formally get nc ≈ 5.6 which belongs to the interval nc ∼ 4–6
of values expected based on our casual experience.
Second, the value n2c estimates the minimal magnitude Mth,m of images that can be
quantitatively compared with a given image M of magnitude M , i.e.,
Mth,m ∼ 1
n2c
M .
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Within the developed model Ekman’s law (4) deals with the corresponding threshold
Mth,e = κeM describing the just-noticeable difference of magnitudes provided the stimuli
causing the emergence of these images are currently active. The inequality Mth,e 
Mth,m cannot hold because for a difference between two magnitudes to admit quantitative
evaluation it has to be well recognized. The opposite inequality Mth,e Mth,m seems to
be in direct contradiction to the self-consistency of human sensory system. Indeed the
physiological necessity of magnitude discrimination admitting qualitative implementation
but not quantitative evaluation is unclear. So it is quite reasonable to hypothesize that
the two thresholds should be similar, i.e., the equality
κe ∼ 1
n2c
(43)
has to hold. Using Teghtsoonian’s estimate of the Ekman fraction κe ≈ 0.03 (Sec. 3,
Proposition 1) Exp. (43) immediately gives nc ∼ 5.8. The latter again is rather close to
the values noted above. Whence it also follows that the parameters ∆e and ∆m entering
the proximity potential for images when their stimuli are currently active and when their
comparison is based on memory are related as ∆e ∼ ∆2m.
9. Direct quantitative comparison of images: Intrarange properties
In the present section I discuss the regression and range effects as well as the hysteresis
in magnitude quantitative comparison within the range of direct commensurability.6 To
be determined, let us consider two images M1 and M2 of magnitudes M1 and M2 when
M1 < M2 and the image M1 is regarded as the standard object whereas the image M2
it trial one.
Following the model for direct quantitative comparison of images developed in Sec. 7,
the collection of quantities C = {rn} that may be used for quantifying the magnitude
ratio M2/M1 is constructed and the corresponding value Bn = B(M2/M1, rn) of the
proximity potential is calculated for each rn ∈ C.
9.1. Perfect rationality approximation
If the choice of quantities {rn} were perfectly rational, then the optimal value rn,opt
matching the minimum of the proximity potential, minBn, within the collection {Bn}
would be selected. Figure 6 (left panel) depicts the corresponding step-wise variations in
the quantity rn,opt within the region M2/M1 . n2c , where the magnitudes M1 and M2
are commensurable (here the value nc = 4 has been used).
The right panel shows the corresponding pattern of proximity potential. As seen, the
variations in minBn are about or less 0.1 inside the region M2/M1 < n
2
c . Therefore the
choice of “mean” value as an additional class of categorization may be ignored (Sec. 6).
However, when the magnitude ratio M2/M1 goes outside the region [1, n
2
c ] the value of
minBn starts to grow and finally exceeds the threshold B0. In this case the feasibility of
quantitative comparison of the two magnitudes has to be rejected and these magnitudes
become incommensurable. In the presented analysis I have estimated the thresholdB0 as
a quantity exceeding to some degree the characteristic variations in minBn for internal
values M2/M1 ∈ [1, n2c ] and set B0 = 0.3 for nc = 4.
6The related experimental data were described in Sec. 3, Propositions 4, 5.
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Figure 6: The choice of the evaluated ratio rn,opt for magnitudes M2 and M1 determined by the
minimum of proximity potential minBn (left panel) and this potential minimum vs the ratio M2/M1
(right panel). Red line represents the potential attributed to rejecting the feasibility of image comparison,
in the presented data the parameters nc = 4 and B0 = 0.3 were used (Sec. 6).
Figure 7: The probabilistic pattern of rn-choice in the quantitative comparison of magnitudes M1 and
M2 (left panel) and the hysteresis effected presented within the perfect rationality approximation (right
panel). The presented results were obtained for nc = 4 and B0 = Bi = 0.3.
9.2. Probabilistic features of magnitude quantification
The probabilistic features of magnitude comparison described by the developed model
are illustrated in Fig. 7. As previously, for a given ratio M2/M1 the proximity potential
Bn is calculated for each quantity rn. However the choice of a value rn also allowing
for the possibility of rejecting the set of options {rn} as a whole is described by the
probability given by Exp. 36. The result is shown in Fig. 7 (left panel), where the blue
strips match the quantities {rn} and the saturation of their color visualizes the probability
of choice according to the formula
saturationn ∝
{
Pn(M2/M1) ·
[
max
M2/M1
Pn(M2/M1)
]−1}2
.
In the same way the red strip visualizes the rejection of image comparison.
As seen, the position of fuzzy boundary between the regions of magnitude commen-
surability and incommensurability can be estimated as (M2/M1)c ∼ 25. The later value
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may be treated as the maximal dynamic range of sensory magnitudes and fits well its
estimates 101.5 ∼ 30 obtained for the available experimental data (Sec. 3), which also
justifies the used parameter nc = 4.
The obtained results allow me to state that the model for direct quantitative com-
parison of images developed in Sec. 7 is characterized by the following features.
• Fuzziness of direct commensurability. The bounded capacity of human cognition
reflected in the probabilistic mechanism of image comparison endows the region
of magnitude direct commensurability—the maximal dynamic range of sensory
magnitudes—with fuzzy boundaries.
• Regression effect. The probabilistic choice of individual values rn ∈ C in evaluating
the quantitative relationship between magnitudes M1 and M2 is biased towards the
underestimation of the ratio M2/M1 in the analyzed case.
7 This underestimation
seems to be caused by that the number of quantities {r<n } located under the value
M2/M1 exceeds the number of similar quantities {r>n } above it for M2/M1 ∼ n2c .
• Range effect. The bias noted above becomes more pronounced as the magnitude
ratio M2/M1 increases, which is illustrated by dotted line in Fig. 7 (left panel).
• Scaling. Because the ratio M2/M1 of magnitudes rather than their individual
values determines the image comparison the absolute value of the underestimation
(overestimation) should increase linearly, at least in the first approximation, with
growth of magnitudes. If the relative thickness of M(m)-cloud boundary 1/nc
increases with magnitude this increase can become super-linear.
The choice of the relevant values from the collection {rn} can be affected by the
decision inertia—the preference for the currently selected option [e.g., 88, 89]. I model
this effect ascribing an additional preference potential Bi to the currently selected value
rcur. Thereby the probability of selecting a value rn is represented as
Pn =
1
Z
exp
[
−Bn + δ(rn, rcur)Bi
]
, (44)
where δ(r, r′) is the Kronecker symbol. In this case as the test magnitude M2 gradu-
ally increases or decreases the change of the previously selected estimate rcur requires
overcoming the potential barrier Bi. So, on the average, the dependence r
+
n (M2/M1)
corresponding to the gradual increase in M2/M1 has to lie below a similar dependence
r−n (M2/M1) for the gradual decrease.
Figure 7 (right panel) justifies this statement. The shown dependences were con-
structed within the approximation dealing with the minimal proximity potential modified
as shown by Exp. 44. In plotting these data I set Bi = B0 assuming that the preference
of keeping the previously selected value rcur and the readiness for rejecting the image
comparison may be of the same mechanism.
The given result allows me to state that the model for direct quantitative comparison
of images after its modification allowing for decision inertia admits also hysteresis in
magnitude quantification. Namely:
7This conclusion is drawn for M2 > M1. In the opposite case, M2 < M1, it converts into the
overestimation of the ratio M2/M1.
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• Hysteresis. The effect of decision inertia endows the image comparison with mem-
ory effects, in particular, makes the dependence rn(M2/M1) sensitive to the direc-
tion of magnitude gradual variations.
All the features noted above in this section are due to the discreteness of values {rn}
available for quantifying magnitude relations, which reflects the bounded capacity of
human cognition.
10. Multi-step comparison of images and the Fechner-Stevens dilemma
10.1. Multi-step comparison
When the magnitudes M1 and M2 of two images M1 and M2 differ substantially
such that, e.g., M2  n2cM1 their direct quantitative comparison becomes impossible
because there is no unit 1 commensurable with both of them. In this case, however,
the comparison can be implemented via several steps with intermediate units pair-wise
commensurable as illustrated in the following diagram for three-step comparison:
estimated: M1
r1−−−−→
r1
m′ r2−−−−→
r1r2
m′′ r3−−−−→
r1r2r3
m2
M1
∥∥∥ x1′ x1′′ x M2
given: M1
r1q1−−−−→
r1q1
M ′
r2q2−−−−−−→
r1r2·q1q2
M ′′
r3q3−−−−−−−−−→
r1r2r3·q1q2q3
M2
(45)
Here r1 is the quantity from the collection {rn} taken consciously to quantify the rela-
tionship between the magnitudes of the first intermediate level {m′,M ′} and the initial
one {M1,M1}. The cofactor q1 quantifies the corresponding unconscious underestima-
tion (overestimation) of the magnitude M ′. The quantities r2, q2 and r3, q3 play the
same roles in the transitions from the fist to second intermediate levels and from the
second to final (third) levels.
Turning to the given example, the logarithmic form of theN -step relationship between
the estimated value m2 and the real magnitude M2 is written as
lnM2 − lnM1 = lnm2 − lnM1 +
N∑
i=1
ln qi . (46)
This relationship has regular and random (irregular) components. First, there could
be several configurations {r1, r2, r3, . . .} leading from M1 to m2 different in the selected
quantities and their number. Nevertheless if I introduce the value 〈ln r〉 being a certain
mean of the quantities {rn} the “distance” between lnM1 and lnm2 can be quantified
as 〈ln r〉 · η, where the value η not necessarily integer represents the number of steps N .
Second, the cofactors {qi} are some random quantities reflecting the probabilistic nature
of magnitude evaluation. Separating the mean value 〈ln q〉 and random fluctuations δ ln qi
with zero mean in ln qi expression (46) can be approximately rewritten as
ln
[
m2
M1
]
= 〈ln r〉 · η (47a)
ln
[
M2
M1
]
=
[〈ln r〉+ 〈ln q〉]η + √η · ξ , (47b)
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where ξ is a random variable of unit amplitude and  is a quantity determined by random
variations of the underestimation cofactor, 2 ∼ 〈(δ ln qi)2〉. At the used level of rigor the
parameters entering Exps. (47) should be regarded as given beforehand and constructing
the specific relationship between them and the model of direct quantitative comparison
of magnitudes deserves an individual investigation.
In the case of small values of the parameter  there is some critical number of inter-
mediate steps of comparison, Nc ∼ ηc = 1/2, such that if N  Nc the random term in
Exp. (47b) is ignorable and system (47) leads to the relationship
m2 = M
1−γ
1 M
γ
2 . (48)
where the exponent γ = 〈ln r〉/[〈ln r〉+ 〈ln q〉] and 0 < γ < 1. Expression (48) also holds
for M2 M1/n2c . I will call this limit case the power-law mode of multi-step comparison.
It capacity is bounded by the ratio M2/M1
ln
[
M2
M1
]
c
∼
[〈ln r〉+ ω〈ln q〉]
2
.
For  ∼ 1 this limit case does not exist. It should be noted that Exp. (48) may be contin-
ued into the region of direct commensurability and treated as a certain approximation.
It exhibits the required underestimation or overestimation of test magnitudes and the
exponent γ reflects the basic properties of image quantitative comparison.
When the number of steps in the image comparison exceeds the critical value, N 
Nc the random term in Exp. (47b) become essential, 
√
η & 1, which gives rise to
unpredictable variations in the estimate
m2 = M
1−γ
1 M
γ
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
regular factor
× e−γ√ηξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
random factor
whose amplitudes can exceed the regular cofactor substantially. In this case the com-
parison of the absolute values of magnitudes loses any sense. The given problem can be
overcome if in quantifying the images we consciously remain at the “logarithmic” level
where the random second term in Exp. (47b) is small in comparison with the first, regular
one. It gives the relationship
lnm2 = (1− γ) lnM1 + γ lnM2 (49)
for which the conversion to the level of absolute values is not allowed. I will call this case
the logarithmic-law mode of multi-step comparison.
It should be noted that laws (48) and (49), as it must be, are invariant with respect to
changing the units of magnitudes, i.e., their form does not change within the replacement
(m2,M2,M1)→ (m2,M2,M1)× C, where C > 0 is an arbitrary constant.
10.2. The level of units, sensory magnitudes, and the Fechner-Stevens dilemma
Our life in the environment filled with various permanent stimuli should cause the
emergence of their images in the mental space whose magnitudes are tacitly treated as the
units in comparison with other images. So via referring to this level of units it becomes
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Figure 8: Illustration of the relationship between the sensory magnitude and image magnitude con-
structed based on the quantitative comparison of images. Here dashed lines represents the image mag-
nitude and in plotting nc = 4 and γ = 0.8 were used.
possible to deal with mental evaluation of magnitudes on their own, i.e., without noting
directly the image of comparison. This case is described by the expressions obtained
before where the magnitude M1 of the image M1 is set equal to unity, M1 = 1, thereby
all the other magnitudes are quantified in units of M1.
The magnitude M as a parameter of the M(m)-cloud is a variable hidden from our
mind because consciously we operate with these images as whole entities. However fixing
the level of units we acquire the capacity to attribute consciously some numerical measure
to a given image just comparing it with the corresponding unit. In this way it becomes
possible to speak a perceived “intensity” of stimulus—sensory magnitude—µ(M |M1)
being a certain function of the image magnitude M provided the magnitude M1 of the
level of units is fixed, maybe, tacitly. Assuming that initially conscious estimates are
converted with time into some automatic sensation of external stimuli we may introduce
the sensation magnitude µ(M) as a given on its own.
Keeping this possibility in mind I propose the following description of the sensation
magnitude within inner psychophysics. After fixing the level of units we can divide the
region of image magnitudes into three parts. First, it is the region of images whose
magnitudes are too low to be recognized:
R0 : M . 1
n2c
.
I call it the region of imperceptible images. Here the sensory magnitude has to be set
equal to zero, µ = 0. The region imperceptible images is followed by the region of
commensurable images specified by the condition
Rc : 1
n2c
.M . n2c , in Fig. 8 it is the region (0,1].
Its images are directly commensurable with the level of units. In this region it is natural
to relate the sensory magnitude µ with the image magnitude M using Exp. (48) as an
approximating ansatz
µ = Mγ , (50)
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which may be referred to as the inner Stevens’ law. The last, third region
Rl : M & n2c , in Fig. 8 it is the region [1,∞)
is related to images admitting only multi-step comparison with the level of units. Here for
simplicity I have accepted that Nc ∼ 1, so the power-law mode of multi-step comparison
does not exist.
In this case we have to attribute image quantification to the “logarithmic” level and
expression (49) prompts us to regard lnm as the desired sensory magnitude. However,
in the given form it is not relevant for two reasons. First, any rescaling of units leads
to the anomalous transformation of such a sensory magnitude, instead of the standard
renormalization in the form of some cofactor this sensory magnitude receives an additive
component, lnm → lnm + C. Second, the transition from the region Rc to Rl cannot
be accompanied by a sharp drop in sensory magnitude.
The two obstacles are overcome if the sensory magnitude µ is related to the image
magnitude M in the region Rl, e.g., the ansatz
µ =
n2γc
ln
[
n2c(1− xcut)
] · ln [M − xcutn2c]. (51)
Its parameter xcut = 0.4–0.6 for nc = 4–5 and γ = 0.8–1.0 endows the transitionRc → Rl
with the continuity in the dependence µ(M) and its derivative. Expression (51) may be
referred as the inner Fechner’s law.
Relating the image magnitude M to the intensity N of neural signals generated by the
perceptual subsystem, e.g., via some proportionality M ∝ N and accepting the power-law
transformation N(S), Exp. (7), we convert the constructed law of inner psychophysics
into the corresponding combined Fechner-Stevens’s law for outer psychophysics.
Summarizing the aforesaid, the introduction of sensory magnitude in the present way
can be regarded as a solution to the Fechner-Stevens dilemma. Indeed the quantitative
comparison of mental images of physical stimuli leads to Fechner’s law and Stevens’s law
within inner psychophysics as particular asymptotics of the sensory magnitude depen-
dence on the image magnitude in different limit cases (Fig. 8). In this way the gist of
the Fechner-Stevens dilemma is overcome because in the presented explanation Fechner’s
law is not a consequence of Weber’ law (Ekman’s law in inner psychophysics).
11. Conclusion: Inner psychophysics and physics of mind
The present paper for the first time has demonstrated the relation between psy-
chophysics studying quantitative regularities of external stimulus perception and a novel
direction in physics—physics of mind—devoted to mathematical description of mental
phenomena from the first-person point of view. The experimental data collected in the
20th century by psychophysics and neuroscience of brain activity provide strong evidence
for the existence of universal mechanisms responsible, in particular, for the main psy-
chophysical laws. This universality opens a gate toward developing mathematical models
for mental processes and phenomena turning to the notions we operate with in our mind.
As the main specific result, I have developed a phenomenological model for human
evaluation of external stimuli that from a rather general standpoint explains the universal
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laws of inner psychophysics and proposed a solution to the Fechner-Stevens dilemma.
Two premises take the central place in my constructions.
First, mechanisms responsible for the main psychophysical laws should be attributed
to the mental processes, conscious and unconscious. Actually I have accepted Fechner’s
point of view on the origin of regularities governing the relationship between external
stimuli and their sensation, which prompted him to put forward the concept of inner
psychophysics. A number of arguments for the existence of a macrolevel mechanism
common for all the sensory modalities have been presented based on literature review of
experimental data.
Second, mental and cognitive phenomena admit a closed mathematical description
based on the notions and concepts that can be stated turning to the conscious experience
as experienced from the first-person point of view. This premise is rooted in phenomeno-
logical description of human mind—the branch of philosophy launched by Husserl and
Heidegger at the beginning of 20th century. Endowing phenomenology with mathemati-
cal formalism I came to the concept of two complementary components—objective and
subjective ones—in describing human behavior [1]. The objective component represents
the physical world and is governed by classical laws of physics. The subjective component
represents the inner world of humans and is assumed to be governed by its own laws not
necessarily reducible to physical ones.
In the frameworks of psychophysics the objective component is the perceptual sub-
system comprising our sense organs which directly convert external stimuli into neural
signals. The subjective component is represented as a mental space with images of exter-
nal stimuli whose emergence is caused by the neural signals generated by the perceptual
subsystem. After emergence these images become individual entities of the mental space
possessing their own properties and dynamics independent of the stimuli initially induced
them. In this sense the mental space is the macrolevel description of how neural signals
generated by the perceptual subsystem are processed by the central subsystem affected
by memory, the accumulated experience, etc.
Appealing to our causal experience I have postulated several properties these images
have to exhibit with respect to their magnitude. In terms of subspace of their magnitudes:
• The image is a cloud in the magnitude subspace—a certain region with blurred
boundary.
• The structure of these clouds is universal for all images and is determined by the
internal properties of mental space, external stimuli affect only the parameters
of the cloud structure but not the structure itself. The image magnitude is a
parameter specifying the mean cloud size.
• The comparison of images with respect to their “intensity” is implemented based
on the overlapping of their clouds which determines the probability of treating the
images as equivalent in magnitude.
• Two operations with images as whole entities is introduced in the mental space: (i)
the qualitative comparison of images with respect to their equality in magnitude
and (ii) the fusion of identical images whose number does not exceed a certain
value. The quantitative comparison of image magnitudes is implemented based on
the two operations.
These features have enabled me to explain the main psychophysical regularities and to
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obtain plausibly estimates for the basic constants of inner psychophysics. In particular,
it is:
• The proportionality of just noticeable difference to image magnitude (Ekman’s
law) stemming from the qualitative comparison of images and the estimate of the
proportionality fraction (Ekman’s fraction).
• The universality of the maximal dynamic range of magnitude evaluation related to
the direct commensurability of image magnitudes depending on magnitude ratio.
Besides it is a plausible relationship between Ekman’s fraction and the capacity of
direct commensurability.
• The underestimation and overestimation of strong and weak stimuli as well as the
hysteresis in the magnitude estimations in gradually increasing and then decreasing
the intensity of external stimulus.
Up to now there is a challenging problem in psychophysics, it is that fact that two
basic laws—Fechner’s law and Stevens’ law—are in contradiction to each other. Each of
them describes the human sensation of external stimuli but their functional forms are
different. Reconciling the two laws is a subject of long-term debates but no solution that
would satisfy the participants has been found. In the present paper I have proposed
an original solution to this Fechner-Stevens dilemma. Within the developed model for
image comparison, Fechner’s law and Stevens’s law arise as asymptotics of one general law
describing the relationship between sensory magnitude and external stimulus intensity
in different limit cases. In this way the gist of the Fechner-Stevens dilemma is overcome
because in the presented explanation Fechner’s law is not a consequence of Weber’ law.
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